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ABSTRACT 
Targeting terrorist leadership is a common strategy used by 
governments.  The appeal of a quick strike with minimal 
casualties, combined with the possible swift defeat of the 
terrorist organization, makes it a very attractive 
approach.  It is important to understand the circumstances 
under which targeting terrorist leaders will be effective, 
and the circumstances where such an attack will increase 
support for the terrorists.  This thesis utilizes the 
Freeman Terrorist Leadership Targeting Model to analyze the 
effectiveness of Israel’s campaign to target Hamas leaders 
from 1987—2007. 
Israel’s campaign to target Hamas leaders produced 
mixed results.  Hamas’ political influence increased in 
spite of (and possibly in some degree because of) Israeli 
operations.  However, targeting leadership deprived Hamas 
of key leaders and contributed to a declining frequency and 
effectiveness of Hamas suicide attacks. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
effectiveness of Israel’s 1987-2007 campaign to arrest and 
kill Hamas leaders.  Using the Freeman Leadership Targeting 
Model, the goal is to understand whether targeting terror 
leaders can be an effective strategy.  By analyzing a 
terror leader’s charismatic and operational importance, we 
may be able to predict whether killing or capturing that 
leader will lead to the group’s downfall or inspire further 
violence.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary question is whether leadership targeting 
is an effective strategy.  There are many negative aspects 
related to pursuing this strategy, including inspiring 
retaliatory attacks, generating negative world opinion, and 
creating martyrs.  Therefore, it would be valuable for 
policymakers to have a model that can help predict whether 
the attack will be successful and overcome the costs 
associated with pursuing this strategy. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
The Freeman model analyzes a leader’s charismatic and 
operational importance.  However, there are additional 
factors that can be examined in the Israeli—Palestinian 
conflict.  This thesis also examines attempts to influence 
Hamas through democracy and economic pressure. 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
A case study is used to analyze Hamas from 1987 to 
2007 and to review the circumstances leading to its 
creation.  Using the framework provided by Freeman, I will 
examine the importance of several Hamas leaders, including 
Sheik Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, and how 
their assassinations by Israel in 2004 affected the 
organization. 
D. POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES 
The use of one case to evaluate the efficacy of the 
terrorist-leadership targeting model is problematic.  
However, each case study can provide valuable insight into 
understanding and developing the model.  In addition, when 
combined with other case studies, we gain a greater 
understanding of the benefits and costs provided by a 
decapitation strategy. 
Using the Freeman model to analyze Hamas is 
problematic for three reasons.  First, the model assumes 
that leadership is either singular or paired.  However, 
Hamas has many leaders, both inside and outside of the 
occupied territories.  Second, determining the importance 
of individual leaders within Hamas is difficult.  It has 
been unclear several times who was in charge.  In addition, 
the literature on Hamas is widely split on the role that 
inspirational leaders had on operational matters.  Third, 
Hamas is — and has always been — more than a terrorist 
organization.  Despite these challenges, the model provides 
a valuable framework to evaluate the effectiveness of 
Israeli operations to arrest and kill Hamas leaders.   
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II. FREEMAN TERRORIST LEADERSHIP TARGETING MODEL 
A. OVERVIEW 
Michael Freeman, an assistant professor of defense 
analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, is developing a 
model that studies the effectiveness of targeting terrorist 
leadership and the resulting impact on terror 
organizations.  He states that “we should not assume that 
targeting the leaders of terrorist organizations is 
necessarily an effective strategy.”1  The primary variables 
he examines are a leader’s inspirational and operational 
leadership abilities.  Using these variables, we can begin 
to explain why some instances of leadership targeting have 
been effective and others have not. 
The central question the model attempts to answer is 
when leadership targeting will be an effective strategy.  
An important distinction is made between a successful 
operation to kill or capture a terrorist leader, and 
whether or not the operation is effective.  An effective 
operation has the desired effect on the terrorist 
organization (i.e., the demise of the group, a reduction in 
activity). However, successful attacks can be ineffective 
if they create a martyr or otherwise galvanize terrorists 
and their supporters. 
A decapitation strike — or “leadership targeting” —
involves killing or capturing terrorist leaders.  In some 
                     
1  The current paper being produced by Freeman is unpublished at this 
time.  The document in its entirety, with complete explanation of 
leadership targeting, will be forthcoming.  For the purpose of this 
paper, the unpublished version is referenced.  Changes may exist 
between the unpublished version being referenced in this paper and the 
final published version. 
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cases, the method used may be very important in determining 
effectiveness.  The Peruvian capture of Abimael Guzman – 
and the broadcast of humiliating images of Guzman in prison 
garb — is an example of how capturing terrorist leaders may 
be preferable to killing them. 
B. INSPIRATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of 
vast change, they must be intensely discontented 
… and they must have the feeling that by the 
possession of some potent doctrine, infallible 
leader or some new technique they have access to 
a source of irresistible power.2  
Leaders play a critical role in attracting terrorist 
recruits.  Getting someone to join a terror group and 
commit acts that society deems illegal and/or immoral 
requires some motivation.  It requires even more incentive 
for terrorists to risk or sacrifice their lives in 
conducting attacks.  There are several factors that 
contribute to terrorist sympathizers making the leap to 
become terrorists.  Desperate situations — such as the 
plight of many Palestinians — are one of the most 
important.  In those situations, the presence of a 
charismatic leader and a compelling ideology can motivate a 
sympathizer to cross the line and join a terrorist 
movement.   
The model examines the importance of leaders in 
developing and promulgating the ideology, and the role of 
charisma in inspiring individuals to join terror groups and 
commit terrorist acts.  It is assumed that the importance 
                     
2  Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), 
11. 
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of charismatic leaders and their ideology are most critical 
in the early stages of a terrorist organization. 
1. Charisma 
For the individual, choosing to take up the armed 
struggle against the state is a risky proposition.  It is 
better to let others do the fighting, even if you subscribe 
to the ideology of the group.  The presence of a 
charismatic leader is often the key element that persuades 
people to put their own lives at risk. 
Typically, the charismatic leader develops a following 
amongst a small group of ideologues who see in the leader 
as a person with extraordinary gifts.  Armed with these 
gifts, and a following of faithful disciples, the 
charismatic leader is able to convince others to support 
and take part in the movement. 
Max Weber believed that a desperate situation is a 
prerequisite to the rise of a charismatic leader.3  Eric 
Hoffer agreed: 
[A] leader cannot create the conditions which 
make the rise of a movement possible. He cannot 
conjure a movement out of the void.  There has to 
be an eagerness to follow and obey and an intense 
dissatisfaction with things as they are.4 
2. Ideology 
A terrorist ideology identifies what the problem is, 
what the solution is, who the enemy is, and what the 
                     
3  Michael Freeman, “Leadership Targeting of Terrorist Groups: A 
Strategic Assessment” (unpublished, Naval Postgraduate School), 15. 
4  Hoffer, The True Believer, 111. 
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legitimate means are.5  Prior to the founding of Hamas, the 
main Palestinian resistance groups to Israeli occupation 
were the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  The PLO was secular and militant, 
while the Muslim Brotherhood was Islamic but wanted to 
delay the armed struggle.  Hamas combined the militancy of 
the PLO and the religious ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
To some extent, Yassin and al—Rantissi were critical in 
shifting the ideology of their core group from within the 
Muslim Brotherhood.   
However, in this case, the situation and historical 
context had much to do with the creation of the ideology. 
The ideological development of Hamas was driven more by the 
circumstances in Palestine than by individual leaders. 
Eric Hoffer wrote: 
Hatred is the most accessible and comprehensive 
of all unifying agents.... Mass movements can rise 
and spread without belief in a God, but never 
without belief in a devil.  Usually the strength 
of a mass movement is proportionate to the 
vividness and tangibility of its devil.6   
Since Israel was created in 1948, there have been many 
reasons why Palestinians might view Israel as the enemy: 
the refugee camps in 1948, Arab humiliations in three wars, 
armed incursions into Lebanon and the occupied territories, 
and Israeli bulldozers razing homes in Gaza, to name a few.  
Yasser Arafat, Sheik Yassin and others were important in 
advocating the appropriate solution and means; however, the 
                     
5  Michael Freeman, class lecture, International Terrorism, spring 
quarter 2007, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
6  Hoffer, The True Believer, 65. 
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problem and the enemy were readily apparent to all 
Palestinians. 
C. OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
Leaders do more than inspire and promote ideology.  
They also conduct training, plan and execute attacks, and 
direct others to do the same.  The Freeman model considers 
a leader’s importance in three aspects of operational 
leadership: strategic, tactical and organizational.  
1. Strategic Leadership 
Strategic leadership involves decisions on the overall 
strategy of the organization.  Examples in Hamas history 
include the decision to time the split with the Brotherhood 
to coincide with the First Intifada, the decision to limit 
attacks to targeting Israelis and Palestinian 
collaborators, and the development of Hamas’ charter.   
2. Tactical Leadership 
Tactical leadership entails directing individual 
attacks, including choosing the target, the timing of an 
attack, and which cell members will be used to carry it 
out.  The target can be a result of a strategic decision if 
it has extraordinary qualities.  For example, religious 
targets in Jerusalem have both strategic and tactical 
significance.  However, many targets are tactical choices 
such as the particular Israeli checkpoint to target for a 
suicide bombing. 
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3. Organizational Leadership 
Organizational leadership includes fundraising, 
recruiting, building alliances, etc.  In Hamas’ network of 
social and political organizations, there is a requirement 
for managing different activities.  Fundraising for Hamas 
occurs around the world, particularly in Europe, America 
and the Middle East.  In addition, Hamas has worked with 
Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and even Fatah in the past when 
they shared common goals.  The requirements in leading this 
vast array of tasks requires some measure of 
decentralization of power within Hamas.  The model assumes 
that the more power held by the leader, the more vulnerable 
Hamas would be to leadership decapitation. 
D. CONCEPTIONAL MODEL 
The model rates a leader’s operational importance on 
the X—axis and the inspirational importance on the Y—axis 
(see Figure 1).  As previously mentioned, the operational 
variable includes strategic, tactical and organizational 
components. The inspirational variable includes charismatic 
and ideological components.  Presumably, most terrorist 
groups begin in the upper right of the graph, where leaders 
are most important.   
The model assumes that for the terrorist group to be 
successful, it must grow.  A small group in Quadrant I 
would be incapable of ending Israeli occupation, much less 
the destruction of Israel.  Therefore, nascent terror 
groups must recruit and grow beyond the capabilities of the 
initial cadre.7 
                     
7  Freeman, “Leadership Targeting,” 28. 
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If a terrorist group grows successfully over time, the 
importance of the individual leaders usually diminishes in 
relation to the overall organization.  There are different 
paths leaders will take as they become less critical; some 
will retain their inspirational importance (“Persistent 
Leaders”), while others will retain their operational roles 
(“Fleeting Leaders”).  The curves in Figure 1 represent two 
possible pathways. The leader that goes from Quadrant I to 
II, then IV, retains more importance in inspirational 
matters.  In contrast, operationally oriented leaders will 
go from Quadrant I to III, then to Quadrant IV.  These are 
two of the most likely pathways.  However, any path in 
between is possible, and it is feasible for an individual 
leader to grow in one — or both — of the variables.  These 
leaders are called “Neo-Visionary” and “Resurgent” leaders. 
Freeman concludes that leaders in Quadrant I – the 
most important in both variables – are the best targets for 
single decapitation attacks.  In contrast, Quadrant IV 
organizations may be immune to leadership targeting because 
no leader is critical either inspirationally or 
organizationally.  Finally, he theorizes that targeting 
inspirational leaders in Quadrant II should be more 
successful than targeting operational leaders in Quadrant 
III.  The reason is that inspirational and charismatic 







































III. HAMAS CASE STUDY 
A. HISTORY OF HAMAS 
Hamas was officially founded in 1987, during the First 
Intifada by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Al-Abdel Azia al-Rantissi, 
and five others.  However, the organization’s roots go back 
much further.  According to Hamas’ own semi-official 
history, the group began organizing in 1967 among hard—core 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza.  
The Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza — and the future 
leaders of Hamas — focused on spiritual and social programs 
from 1967 until the early 1980s, with the goal of 
revitalizing Islam in Palestine.  Its objective was to 
resist the Israeli occupation but believed it first needed 
to rebuild the Islamic faith of the people.  Subsequently, 
it established Islamic schools, mosques and other social 
institutions in Gaza and the West Bank.  These efforts, 
combined with a rise of Islamic reform movements throughout 
the Arab world, led to a dramatic rise in Islam in the 
occupied territories.  For example, from 1967 to 1987, the 
number of mosques in Gaza increased from 200 to 600 and 
from 450 to 700 in the West Bank.8   
As economic conditions continued to deteriorate in 
Gaza, pressure built within the Islamic community to get 
involved in protests and more forcibly resist the Israeli 
occupation.  The pressure on the Brotherhood leadership — 
or Ikhwan — increased further when the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ) was founded in the late 1970s by Fathi al-
                     
8  Zaki Chehab, Inside Hamas (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 145.  
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Shiqaqi.  The creation of PIJ gave frustrated Palestinians 
an Islamic alternative to the PLO.  When Israel invaded 
Lebanon in 1982, additional strain was placed on the Ikhwan 
to become more militant.9  
Ultimately, some leaders felt the Muslim Brotherhood 
was unable to “withstand the pressure from within their own 
ranks”10 to become more aggressive in protesting the Israeli 
occupation.  Discontent among young Islamic supporters of 
the Palestinian Brotherhood leadership grew, and some 
members defected to the PIJ.11  “As time passed, the 
position of the Ikhwan, which continued to discourage 
participation in any form of protest activities, became 
indefensible.”12 
Consequently, in 1982, Sheikh Yassin and other Ikhwan 
leaders decided to “supplement the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
radical Islamic ideology with Palestinian national 
overtones,”13 and prepare for an armed resistance.  This was 
followed by a meeting in 1983 of Palestinian Brotherhood 
leaders in Amman that laid the groundwork for cooperation 
in Gaza, the West Bank and outside Palestine.14  Efforts to 
raise money and accumulate weapons began, and in 1985, a 
special body known as the “Jihaz” was set up in Jordan to 
 
                     
9  Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within (Northampton: Olive 
Branch Press, 2007) 42. 
10  Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, 44. 
11  International Crisis Group, “Dealing with Hamas,” 
www.crisisgroup.org, 6. 
12  Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, 48. 
13  Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for 
Special Studies, “Profile of the Hamas Movement,” intelligence.org.il.  
14  Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, 45. 
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provide logistical support for the organization. Finally, 
in 1986, the Ikhwan decided to encourage followers to 
participate in protests. 
When the First Intifada erupted on December 8, 1987, 
“[t]he Ikhwan had no option except to seize the occasion.”15 
The next day, the Ikhwan decided the time was right to 
begin open resistance to Israeli occupation, and on 
December 14, it issued a press release announcing the birth 
of Hamas.  
Hamas initially advocated less violent resistance, 
including protests, general strikes and boycotting Israeli 
goods.  However, it gradually escalated the means of 
resistance while fostering the radicalization of society.  
One tactic used was transforming the “martyrs” of the First 
Intifada into local heroes.  Hamas accomplished this by 
publishing leaflets that glorified the martyrs.  This 
approach may have influenced young Gazans and subsequently 
helped Hamas recruit suicide bombers.16 
Ironically, the Israeli government initially tolerated 
Hamas because it was an alternative to the PLO and PIJ.  
This initial tolerance is not surprising given the 
Brotherhood’s history of social programs in the occupied 
territories.  As a result, Hamas was able to organize their 
social organizations on the surface while simultaneously 
building an underground network without interference from 
Israeli security forces. 
                     
15  Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, 52. 
16  Youssef Abdou-Enein, “Hamas: A Further Exploration of Jihadist 
Tactics,” Strategic Insights IV (2005). 
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However, by August 1988, Israel began to arrest Hamas 
leaders and activists. The first round of arrests included 
over 120 senior members of Hamas, “including all the 
founding members of Hamas apart from Sheikh Yassin.”17  
Although the Israelis knew about Yassin, they allowed him 
to remain free so they could learn more about Hamas.  As a 
result of this round of arrests, Hamas set up a shadow 
leadership outside Palestine.  This shadow leadership 
reduced the risk posed by future roundups to the 
organization.   
In 1989, this shadow leadership was put to the test 
during a second round of mass arrests.  This round of 
arrests included Sheikh Yassin, and was triggered by the 
kidnapping and killing of two Israeli soldiers.  The Jihaz 
— safely located outside of Palestine — was able to assume 
leadership inside Gaza.  Annual mass arrests during 1990–
1992 saw the same pattern repeat itself: “[w]ith a new and 
more resilient structure in place, and with a seemingly 
inexhaustible supply of recruits, Hamas was able easily to 
recover after every apparently terminal blow.”18 
During these early years, Hamas used its ties to the 
Muslim Brotherhood and their social activities to gain the 
legitimacy and support of the Palestinian people. In 
addition, they earned support due to the fact they were 
finally resisting the occupation. For individual 
Palestinians, the alternatives to Hamas did not have either 
an Islamic background (PLO), or provide the social services 
(PIJ) that Hamas had cultivated for two decades.  
                     
17  Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, 56. 
18  Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, 61. 
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Initially, the primary targets of Hamas attacks were 
Palestinians collaborating with Israel.  The first attack 
on an Israeli civilian by Hamas came in December 1991, and 
was followed by the first suicide bombing in 1994.19  Hamas 
claimed that the purpose of every attack on Israelis was to 
retaliate for Israeli attacks on Palestinians.  At various 
times Hamas used attacks to gain popular support, derail 
the peace process and to weaken its rivals.20 
In December 1992, a Hamas cell kidnapped Israeli 
Sergeant—Major Nissim Toledano.  They subsequently demanded 
the release of Sheik Yassin, who had been arrested during 
the second round of mass arrests in 1989.  Yassin’s jailers 
put him on TV hoping that he would convince Hamas to 
release the hostages.  This allowed Yassin to appeal to the 
Israeli public for the first time and resulted in a 
“publicity bonanza” for Hamas.21  Yassin advised the cell 
against killing Toledano, in order to give the Israelis 
time to meet the cell’s demand to release him.  However, 
Toledano was later executed and on December 16, 2002, 
Israel began another round of mass arrests.  More than 2000 
activists were detained, including 415 Hamas and PIJ 
leaders.  Subsequently, Israel attempted to deport these 
activists to Lebanon.  
At the border, the Lebanese army prevented the 
deportees from entering Lebanon.  They were forced to 
create a makeshift refugee camp where they remained for 
                     
19  Charles Enderlin, “Understanding the Factional Violence in 
Palestine,” speech given in Washington, D.C. (2006). Available at 
www.mideast1.org. 
20  Enderlin, “Understanding Factional Violence,” www.mideast1.org. 
21  Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, 64. 
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eight months.  During those months, the refugees were led 
by al—Rantissi, one of Hamas’ founders.  Hamas and PIJ took 
advantage of the camp to cement connections between West 
Bank and Gaza leaders, and to forge cross faction ties.  In 
addition, the refugees conducted military training with 
Hezbollah that improved Hamas’ capability when they 
returned to the occupied territories.22  The existence of 
the camp increasingly became a problem for Israel.  
Consequently, Israel allowed half of the refugees to return 
to Palestine after eight months in the camp, and the rest 
followed within two weeks.23 
Hamas did not falter with Yassin in prison and al—
Rantissi deported.  As Tamimi writes,  
After each mass detention or mass deportation 
campaign a leadership vacuum ensued and the Hamas 
movement was severely shaken.  But this only 
happened momentarily: on each occasion the 
inevitable outcome was the ascent of a new 
generation of leaders.24   
Only five years since their creation in 1987, Hamas 
was horizontally decentralized with leadership entrenched 
in Gaza, the West Bank, Kuwait and Jordan.   
During the next few years, Hamas continued to conduct 
attacks “in response” to Israeli aggression.  In addition, 
Hamas continued to expand its network of social programs 
and increase its popular support.   
In 1993, the Oslo Accords were signed between the PLO 
and Israel.  The Accords were intended to provide a 
                     
22  International Crisis Group, “Dealing with Hamas,” 8. 
23  Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, 70. 
24  Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, 68. 
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framework to resolve major hurdles in the conflict within 
five years (Israeli settlements, border security, 
Palestinian refugees, etc.).  To many Palestinians, the 
perceived failure of the agreement over the ensuing five 
years validated Hamas’ approach of resistance, in contrast 
to the failed use of negotiation by the PLO.   
On January 5, 1996, Israel assassinated Yahya Ayyash, 
Hamas’ chief bomb maker.  This assassination provoked Hamas 
to retaliate with four bus bombings.  However, Ayyash’s 
death and Israeli operations against other Hamas bomb 
makers led to a decrease in the effectiveness of Hamas 
attacks for several years.25 
The Second Intifada, which began in September 2000, 
saw a dramatic increase in the pace of attacks by Hamas, 
PIJ, and other groups.  In the seven-and-a-half years prior 
to September 2000, Hamas conducted 27 attacks.  During the 
next four years, Hamas conducted 112 attacks that resulted 
in 474 deaths.26  Hamas was not alone in escalating the pace 
of attacks.  Although Hamas was only responsible for 40% of 
all attacks during the Second Intifada, it was the “leading 
perpetrator of suicide bombing[s].”27  This escalation of 
violence influenced Israel to resume targeting Hamas 
leaders more heavily.   
In 2003, Hamas began to recruit and train a standing 
militia in Gaza.  These troops were distinct from the 
                     
25  “Hamas,” www.wikipedia.org, Dec 07. 
26  Ali Wyne, “Suicide Terrorism as Strategy: Case Studies of Hamas 
and the Kurdistan Workers Party,” Strategic Insights IV:7 (2005), 
www.ccc.nps.navy.mil. 
27  Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “Profile of the 
Hamas Movement,” intelligence.org.il. 
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terrorist arm of Hamas, known as the al—Qassam Brigades.  
In 2004, Hamas also scored several political victories in 
local elections.  By this time, Hamas was established 
firmly in the West Bank and Gaza, maintained offices in 
Syria, raised money throughout the world, had a standing 
militia and had won local political victories.  Although 
Yassin and al—Rantissi were both killed by Israeli attacks 
in early 2004, Hamas continued to operate and increase its 
popular support at the expense of the Palestinian Authority 
(PA).  At this time, Hamas was clearly beyond the point 
where a decapitation strike would cripple the organization.  
Prior to 2006, Hamas had an estimated $70M annual 
budget.  Most of these funds went to social programs, 
including schools, orphanages, health clinics, mosques, 
charities.28 
In January 2006, Hamas won the majority of seats in 
the Palestinian government.  They gained 74 of 132 seats in 
the Palestinian parliament with 42.9% of the vote. To some 
degree, this was a protest vote against the corruption of 
the PA and its inability to provide for the social needs of 
the people.29  In addition, economic conditions in Gaza and 
the West Bank were deplorable.  These facts, combined with 
shrewd campaigning and the popularity of Hamas’ social 
programs, brought the group to power.  U.S. Ambassador 
Dennis Ross wrote: 
Support for Hamas has grown out of frustration 
and anger and the ability of the organization to 
fill a vacuum of leadership.  If there is a 
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secular alternative that is credible, most 
Palestinians would support it, particularly 
because Palestinian society remains far more 
secular than religiously devout.30 
B. HAMAS IDEOLOGY 
The Islamic Resistance Movement…strives to raise 
the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine. 
 – Article 6, The Covenant of Hamas 
The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the 
land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated 
for future Muslim generations until Judgment Day. 
It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: 
it, or any part of it, should not be given up.  
 – Article 11 
Hamas was formed by members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Gaza and shares much of its ideology.  This includes the 
desire to reverse the secularization of society and 
perceived decline in Islamic faith.  The Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) believed “that the Muslim nation (ummah) must first be 
brought back to the true path of Islam before it can engage 
in a violent jihad.”31  Hamas departed from the MB and other 
Palestinian groups by combining Islam, nationalism, and 
militancy with an extensive social and political activism.32  
Conditions in the occupied territories (occupation, 
recession, etc.) were critical to the ideological 
development of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza and the 
subsequent transition to a revolutionary ideology.  
Supporting factors included the rise of competing 
resistance movements (most notably the PLO and the PIJ), 
and the success of revolutionary Islam in Iran.   
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To some degree, Yassin and other Hamas co—founders 
were responsible for the ideological switch of means and 
the embracing of armed resistance.  However, it appears the 
shift in ideology came partly as a result of pressure from 
young leaders within the organization who wanted a more 
militant approach.  The shift was also in response to the 
threat of losing influence to the PLO and PIJ, who took 
more aggressive measures that were popular with many 
Palestinians. 
Hamas’ charter was written in 1988, a year after the 
organization was founded.  The author is believed to be Abd 
al—Fattah Dukhan, one of the seven founders who often acted 
as Hamas’ second in command to Yassin.  It stated that the 
problem was the Zionist occupation of Palestine, the enemy 
was Israel, and the solution was a violent jihad.  The 
extremist language in the charter was most likely intended 
to appeal to Palestinians frustrated with PLO concessions 
to Israel.33  
The legitimate means of fighting the jihad has grown 
since inception.  Prior to 1994, there was a slow 
escalation of means beginning with protests, then 
intensified violence — including clashes with police and 
kidnappings.  This escalation culminated in 1994, when 
Hamas conducted its first car and suicide bombings.   
Hamas justifies the use of suicide bombings in two 
ways.  First, it claims that each attack is in response to 
specific Palestinian civilian casualties caused by Israeli 
actions.  Second, it claims that Israel is a militarized 
society; therefore, attacking Israeli civilians is 
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acceptable.  Hamas believes that the use of suicide 
bombings is effective in resisting the occupation and in 
generating support for the movement.  However, Hamas 
restricts attacks when they are less popular with the 
Palestinian people.34   
Hamas opposes the “two—state” solution, and its 
charter calls for the liberation of all of Palestine.  As a 
result, it has been against the peace process, and often 
has stepped up attacks during peace negotiations.  Hamas 
claims to be a national liberation movement and gains some 
measure of support from secular Palestinians who believe 
Hamas has the best approach in dealing with Israel.35 
The significance of Hamas’ charter and relevance to 
current ideology is debatable.  According to Tamimi, “Hamas 
leaders of today…are increasingly convinced that the 
Charter as a whole has been more of a hindrance than a 
help.”36  There are numerous examples of Hamas hinting that 
it would accept a two—state solution if Israel returned to 
the pre—1967 borders, and allowed for the right of return.   
Since the 2006 election, there have been mixed signals 
from Hamas leaders that a two—state solution was possible.  
The election platform called for an independent state and 
omitted any call for destroying Israel.  Khaled Mashal 
stated in February of 2006 that the charter remained in 
force, which called for the destruction of Israel.  Five 
days later, he said that Hamas would end violence if Israel 
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returned to the 1967 borders.37  Other Hamas leaders stated 
that the charter remained in force.   
The clearest departure from the charter came in April 
2006, when Hamas’ foreign minister Mahmoud al—Zahar said in 
a letter to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
that a Hamas government would accept a two—state solution.38  
Three months earlier, Khaled Mashal said that existing 
Palestinian agreements with Israel would be upheld.39 The 
disparity in comments from Hamas is likely due to the need 
to appeal to both moderates and extremists within its 
organization and to its external supporters. 
To date, Hamas has been focused on the “near” enemy 
(Israel), although there have been debates on the issue 
within Hamas leadership.  In November 2006, Hamas’ military 
wing called for Muslims around world to attack American 
targets. However, no attack outside Israel/Palestine has 
been attributed to Hamas.40  Two motivations for Hamas to 
remain focused on the near enemy are first, that much of 
its internal support comes from nationalists focused on 
Israel, and second, that much of its external support comes 
from donors in Europe and America.   
In the past, when Hamas factions called for attacks on 
the “far” enemy, it was over-ruled by leadership.  However, 
there are several scenarios that could influence Hamas to 
target the far enemy.  First, frustration associated with 
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continued failure to gain concessions from Israel may cause 
these leaders to change tactics.  Second, if Hamas 
continues to have difficulty governing Gaza, leaders may be 
encouraged to try a more drastic approach.  Third, as Hamas 
has grown, the possibility of unsanctioned operations has 
increased.   
The Israeli practice of targeting Hamas leaders may 
incidentally contribute to a faction acting on its own 
against the West.  To this point, Hamas’ political leaders 
have, for the most part, been in firm control of the 
military wing of Hamas.  However, as a result of leadership 
targeting and mass arrests, power within Hamas has been 
horizontally distributed, and this will make it a constant 
challenge for its leaders to enforce a coherent strategy.  
Hamas views its religious and social programs as the 
most important tools for recruiting and undermining Israel 
and the PA.41  Economic conditions in Palestine were fertile 
ground for the development of an alternative ideology to 
the secular PA.  For example, in 2003 the unemployment rate 
was 33.5%, and approximately 75% of the population lived 
below the poverty line.42  Dr. Matthew Levitt argues that 
Hamas has sought to undermine PA efforts to improve the 
economy in order to reduce support for the PA.  
After winning the election in 2006, Hamas has faced 
challenges that could alter its ideology.  According to 
Khaled Hroub, Hamas’ election victory led to increased 
focus on short- and medium-term goals associated with 
governance.  He further speculated, “the longer Hamas 
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remains in power, the more tensions will appear between its 
religious and nationalist constituents, with the probable 
pragmatic outcome pushing the movement to a more 
politicized nationalist leaning.”43 
C. HAMAS LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE 
The development of Hamas’ organization and ideology 
were well advanced when it was formed in 1987 and not 
dependent upon individual leaders.  Rather, Hamas was 
loosely structured and relied “heavily on group 
leadership.”44  The executive body is known as the Political 
Committee or Shura Council.  It has 12—14 members, and 
includes inside and outside leaders.  For decision making, 
Hamas “operates through extensive and often time—consuming 
consultation…before reaching a consensus.”  There is also a 
Gaza Steering Committee, some members of which serve on the 
Shura Council as well.  In some cases involving local 
issues, the Steering Committee will act autonomously.45 
In addition, the literature reviewed does not show 
evidence of a strict hierarchical structure within Hamas.  
Rather, it appears as though Yassin had more influence in 
debates than the other co—founders, but was not more 
powerful in any formal way.  Yassin provided some insight 
into Hamas decision making in a letter to fellow leaders: 
These ideas I am sending to you should be studied 
and analyzed in the Shura Council of the movement 
in order that we can make collective 
decisions….it is not permissible for any one 
person or a group to take a decision which would 
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affect the future and decide the fate of our 
movement. Any decision taken by the majority, 
should be obeyed whatever it may be.46 
Hamas claims to have separate political, military and 
social wings of the organization.  However, this claim is 
“fundamentally untrue,”47 as Hamas political leaders 
traditionally were directly involved in operations, 
including recruiting, fund raising and commanding attacks.  
In addition, Hamas uses its network of social organizations 
to indoctrinate and recruit terrorists, provide jobs to 
operatives, and provide logistical support for attacks.48  
Therefore, at least until the election in 2006, there is no 
clear distinction between operational and spiritual 
leaders.  Rather Yassin, al—Rantissi and other leaders were 
likely somewhat responsible for terrorist operations, in 
addition to their involvement in social and inspirational 
programs.  
D. ISRAELI OPERATIONS TARGETING HAMAS LEADERS 
Israel has attempted to kill or capture Hamas leaders 
on many occasions.  Israeli strategy “focused on removing 
the influential and charismatic leaders needed to hold the 
movement together.”49  This section examines seven major 
operations, beginning with the first round of mass arrests 
in 1988, and culminating in the killings of Sheikh Yassin 
and al—Rantissi in 2004.   
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1. 1988: Mass Arrests 
Israel’s first serious move against Hamas occurred in 
1988.  At the onset of the First Intifada, Israel supported 
Hamas as a counter to the PLO and PIJ.  However, as the 
Intifada progressed, Hamas became more militant, which 
eventually resulted in a round of mass arrests of Hamas 
leaders in September 1988.   
Although many key leaders were arrested, Hamas 
survived for several reasons, including its informal 
organization and leadership depth from its Muslim 
Brotherhood background.  In addition, the communal nature 
of leadership meant that all key leaders would have to be 
arrested to result in a leadership void.  However, Yassin 
was not arrested and his importance continued to grow.  
This informal and communal leadership structure arose from 
cultural norms.  In addition, the Ikhwan was influenced by 
experience with Egyptian attempts to arrest leaders of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  As a result, Hamas was organized more 
as a network of community leaders as opposed to a hierarchy 
vulnerable to decapitation.  
Despite these measures, Hamas was impacted by the 
September 1988 detentions.  The arrests prompted a “greater 
fragmentation” of Hamas’ hierarchy.50  In addition, Sheikh 
Yassin emerged as the unquestioned leader of Hamas despite 
the lack of a formal leadership structure.51  A final 
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outcome of this first round of arrests was that Hamas 
organized a group of leaders outside of Palestine who could 
fill any future leadership void. 
2. 1989: Mass Arrests 
Although Hamas leadership was fragmented by the 1988 
arrests, the organization’s popularity continued to grow.  
Its growing militancy prompted Israel to stage a second 
round of arrests in May 1989.  The result decimated Hamas 
leadership; over 1500 leaders and activists were arrested, 
including Sheik Yassin.  Yassin, who was possibly at the 
pinnacle of his operational and inspirational importance, 
was among those detained.  The sheikh’s importance tumbled 
dramatically, and his “status as the one supreme authority 
came to an end.”52  According to Azzam Tamimi, “[t]he mass 
detentions decapitated Hamas: all of its first— and second—
ranking officials were detained.  The Israeli campaign 
almost succeeded in annihilating the movement.”53 
Whereas the first round of arrests led to the creation 
of the “outside” leadership, the second round 
revolutionized Hamas.  The “outside” leaders took over 
Hamas and created a formal structure that emphasized “the 
supremacy of the outside” leadership.54  The existence of 
this outside leadership would later give Hamas the ability 
to survive subsequent attempts at decapitation.  As Tamimi 
writes, the “presence of senior Hamas leaders outside 
 
 
                     
52  Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 58. 
53  Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, 59. 
54  Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 59. 
 28
Palestine shielded the movement not only against 
potentially fatal measures on the part of the Israelis, but 
also against moves by the PLO.”55 
Redundant internal and external leadership, combined 
with the communal nature of Hamas decision making 
diminished the importance of individual leaders.  Despite 
this, support for Hamas grew as its militancy increased.  
Also, Hamas gained prestige as a result of surviving 
repeated Israeli efforts to stop them. 
3. 1992: Mass Deportation 
Faced with an increasingly dangerous threat, Israel 
attempted a third massive operation at crippling Hamas and 
the PIJ when it deported 415 leaders of these movements on 
December 17, 1992.  The deportation occurred after six 
Israeli security forces members were killed during the 
first two weeks of December.56  Once again, Hamas survived 
this attack because of the existence of the outside 
leadership.  In fact, the deportation backfired when 
Lebanon refused to accept them and the subsequent plight of 
the “refugees” garnered international sympathy.   
In addition, deported Hamas and PIJ leaders — led by 
al—Rantissi — connected with Hezbollah leaders and learned 
from their experience fighting Israel.   As a result, Hamas 
improved their bomb-making skills and adapted a drastic 
change in tactics.  To this point, Hamas had not used 
suicide attacks as a means of fighting the Israelis.  
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However, less than a year after the refugees returned in 
1993, Hamas conducted its first suicide bombing. 
4. 1996: Yahya Ayyash Killed 
After three unsuccessful attempts to decapitate Hamas 
through mass arrests and deportations, Israel’s next 
attempt to diminish Hamas’ effectiveness was a targeted 
killing.  After the deportees returned, Hamas increased the 
pace and effectiveness of their attacks.  As Hamas bomb-
making skills grew, the attacks became more spectacular.  
This led to the Israeli decision to kill Yahya Ayyash, aka 
the “Engineer,” Hamas’ chief bomb maker.  Israel 
infiltrated the organization and planted a cell phone for 
Ayyash loaded with explosives; Ayyash was killed January 5, 
1996.  In the aftermath, Hamas conducted at least four 
attacks in retaliation for the Ayyash’s death. 
Although the killing of Ayyash resulted in a short-
term increase in violence, the pace and effectiveness of 
Hamas bombing operations subsequently declined.  Ayyash was 
not an inspirational leader, but he was a technical expert 
and thus important to Hamas’ operations.  His killing is an 
example of effectively targeting a Quadrant IV leader with 
key operational expertise.   
5. 1997: Attempt to Kill Khaled Mashal 
Israel’s fifth leadership targeting operation 
attempted to replicate the success of killing Ayyash, as 
well as strike a blow to the outside leadership.  The 
target was Khaled Mashal — head of Hamas’ outside 
leadership who lived in Jordan.   
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As head of the “outside” leadership, Khaled Mashal was 
a Quadrant III leader.  His importance in operational 
matters was derived from his strategic and organizational 
leadership, including building support in Arab nations and 
controlling the flow of resources into Hamas’ social and 
terrorist activities.  He was not a critical inspirational 
leader.  That role continued to fall primarily to Yassin 
(despite his imprisonment) and local leaders in the 
occupied territories.   
On September 25, 1997, the Israeli attempt to poison 
Mashal failed, and two Mossad agents were captured by 
Jordanian authorities.  In the aftermath, Israel released 
Sheikh Yassin in exchange for the Mossad agents.   
Yassin’s release led to a resurgence of his role in 
Hamas’ operational leadership, and shifted “Hamas’s center 
of gravity” back to the inside leadership.57  He 
transitioned to a Quadrant I leader until his death in 
2004.  Ultimately, the outside leadership was still in 
control of the Hamas, but Yassin’s inspirational leadership 
made him the key leader in the occupied territories. 
6. 2004: Sheikh Yassin Killed 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, one of the founders of Hamas and 
its spiritual leader, was targeted by Israel three times.  
He was arrested in 1984 and imprisoned for a year.  He was 
arrested again in 1989 and stayed in prison until 1997.  As 
Yassin went in and out of prison, his operational 
importance waxed and waned, but he remained the most 
important inspirational figure in Hamas until Israel 
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targeted him for the final time in 2004.  On March 22, 
2004, Yassin was killed by an Israeli helicopter strike in 
response to continued terrorist attacks.   
Ahmed Yassin was born in 1936, in an area north of 
Gaza that was part of the British mandate.  In 1948, his 
family moved to the Gaza refugee camps.  At age 16, Yassin 
was paralyzed after an accident playing on the beach, and 
he was confined to a wheelchair for the rest of his life.  
Yassin joined the Muslim Brotherhood while in college at 
al—Azhar University in Cairo. 
After returning from Cairo, Yassin became well known 
as a “teacher and spiritual leader” in Gaza’s Islamic 
community.  He gained a following through teaching and 
public lectures — particularly among high school students.58  
His weekly sermons drew large crowds, and he gained 
influence by delivering sermons at multiple mosques in 
Gaza59.  After a Nasserist purge of Gaza members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in 1965, Yassin called ten Ikhwan 
leaders together to discuss relaunching the Brotherhood in 
Palestine.60   
During the early stages of the Israeli occupation, 
Yassin “focused primarily on instilling Islamic values and 
ethics in the hearts and minds of the young.  Unlike the 
former Nasser administration in Gaza, the Israeli 
occupation authorities did not object to this seemingly 
benign religious activity.”61  In 1973, he founded the al—
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Mujama al—Islamiya – or Islamic Center.  This was the 
genesis of the network of social organizations Hamas would 
run, which has grown to include health clinics, orphanages, 
sports leagues, summer camps, schools and mosques.62   
During this period, Yassin was particularly 
influential.  His lectures and teachings were important in 
developing the future social programs and ideology that 
would form the basis for launching Hamas in 1987.  He 
helped revive the Islamic community after the Nasser 
regime’s campaign against the Brotherhood, and helped the 
Ikhwan’s ideology compete with the secular PLO. 
As pressure on the Ikhwan to participate in resisting 
Israeli occupation grew during the late 1970s and early 
1980s, Yassin advocated concentrating on reform within the 
Islamic community.  He would later state, “I had a personal 
desire, and I was motivated, to launch the battle as early 
as 1967.  However, whenever we studied the circumstances 
and assessed the resources we found them insufficient and 
had to postpone.”63  The pressure from within the Islamic 
community continued to grow in 1979 following the Iranian 
Revolution and the war in Afghanistan.  In addition, the 
popularity of the PLO and PIJ were growing as they actively 
protested and/or combated the occupation. 
Yassin was one of the key leaders who decided in 1982—
1983 to make the transformation to an armed resistance.  
Under his guidance, the Ikhwan began to prepare 
logistically for the eventual launch of Hamas.  In 1984, 
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Yassin was arrested by Israel for his part in directing an 
operation to stockpile weapons.  He was released a year 
later in a prisoner exchange.64 
When the First Intifada began in December 1987, Yassin 
was one of the seven co—founders of Hamas.  The meeting 
that culminated with the decision to launch Hamas was held 
at Yassin’s house.65  From the beginning, he was directly 
involved in operational decisions including the recruitment 
and direction of individual cells.66  However, the existence 
of six other co—founders limited his influence.   
After Yassin was arrested the second time in 1989, his 
operational importance to Hamas plummeted.  However, his 
trial was televised live by Israel, and he maintained some 
inspirational importance.67  This was apparent by demands 
from Hamas to release him throughout his imprisonment.68  In 
addition, Israel considered releasing Yassin when his 
health started to deteriorate in prison.  The concern was 
that if Yassin died in prison it would increase support for 
Hamas. 
Yassin was eventually released in 1997 after the 
botched Mossad attempt to poison Khaled Mashal in Amman.  
King Hussein demanded that Israel provide the antidote and 
free Yassin in exchange for two Mossad agents who were 
captured in the operation. 
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At various times during his imprisonment, Israel, 
Jordan and the PLO all attempted to drive wedges between 
Hamas’ leadership in and outside of Palestine.  Yassin’s 
release put an end to these efforts and united Hamas.69 
After his release, Yassin was not allowed back into 
Gaza for four months.  During this time, he toured Gulf 
nations where he found a great deal of support from Arab 
leaders frustrated with Israeli actions in the occupied 
territories.  Yassin’s tour provided a financial windfall 
for Hamas.  Upon his return to Gaza, he “found that he was 
widely regarded no longer as merely the leader of Hamas but 
also the symbol of resistance and defiance for millions of 
Palestinians who felt betrayed by the PLO leadership.”70  He 
resumed his position within Hamas and increasingly exerted 
operational control until his assassination in 2004. 
However, Yassin’s power within Hamas was far from 
absolute.  The primacy of the outside leadership was 
maintained.  According to the International Crisis Group, 
Yassin’s “policy statements derive[d] their authority from 
their ability to formulate consensus positions at the 
conclusion of internal discussions.”71 
An incident in 1999 demonstrated the unique 
relationship between the inside and outside leadership in 
Hamas.  Yasser Arafat invited Yassin to the PLO Central 
Council meeting in Gaza in late 1999.  Yassin attended 
despite the objections of the outside leadership.  
Subsequently, the outside leadership’s Political Bureau 
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issued a statement saying that Yassin was not representing 
Hamas.  In response, Yassin left the meetings.  As Levitt 
writes, “Sheikh Yassin’s eventual compliance with the Hamas 
leadership’s decision on this matter represented a final 
ruling as to who was in charge of the movement.”72 
Yassin was often referred to as the “spiritual leader” 
of Hamas.  Khaled Hroub wrote of Yassin, “the calm and 
charismatic leader was until his death the most popular 
personality in the Gaza Strip.”  Yassin’s assassination was 
an important event in the Israeli—Palestinian conflict.  
The attack sparked retaliation from Hamas, including one 
suicide bomber who wrote in his living will: “I shall 
avenge the death of my master, the martyr Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin.”   
Israeli leaders understood that targeting Yassin was a 
calculated risk.  According to Levitt: 
[T]he March 2004 assassination of Sheikh Yassin 
caused Israeli analysts particular concern 
because Yassin was one of the most vocal 
opponents to targeting Western interests among 
senior Hamas leaders….Without Yassin to restrain 
more globally oriented jihadists within Hamas, 
Israeli intelligence officials feared the Hamas 
response to Yassin’s assassination might have 
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Ahmed Qurei, the Palestinian Prime Minister, had 
similar concerns after Yassin’s death: “Yassin is known for 
his moderation, and he was controlling Hamas, and therefore 
this is dangerous.”74 
Figure 2 displays Yassin’s relative importance to 
Hamas, and how it fluctuated throughout his life. Ayyash’s 
importance is also displayed to demonstrate his critical 
role in constructing bombs, in contrast to Yassin’s 
primarily inspirational importance. 
 
Figure 2.   Estimating Yassin’s Influence (1967—2004) 
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7. 2004: Al-Rantissi Killed 
Like Yassin, al-Rantissi was born in present-day 
Israel but moved to a refugee camp after the creation of 
the state in 1948.  He became active with the Muslim 
Brotherhood while attending Alexandria University in Egypt.  
He co-founded both the Islamic Center in Gaza in 1973 and 
Hamas in 1987 with Yassin.   
Al-Rantissi was a spokesman and political leader 
within Hamas but was also active in directly supervising 
terror attacks.75  At the same time, the “[c]harismatic and 
articulate”76 al-Rantissi was a lecturer at the Islamic 
University of Gaza.  He was one of the more outspoken 
leaders of Hamas and was the first leaders of the 
organization to be arrested during the First Intifada.  
According to Zaki Chehab, al-Rantissi “would be the one 
rallying the troops following a setback to keep the 
movement motivated.”77 
Al-Rantissi rose to prominence during the exile of 415 
Hamas and PIJ leaders to Lebanon in 1992.  He led the 
deportees during their eight months in a refugee camp on 
the border.  He oversaw the building of ties between West 
Bank and Gaza members of Hamas, as well as cross-factional 
ties with PIJ.  Upon returning to Israel, al-Rantissi was 
arrested and stayed in an Israeli prison until 1997. 
Like Yassin, al-Rantissi was a Quadrant I/II leader 
but his influence was less than Yassin’s.  He “held 
hardline views but never contradicted Yassin’s more 
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moderate outlook.”78  Al-Rantissi took over inside 
leadership of Hamas in 2004 after Yassin was killed by an 
Israeli airstrike.  Less than one month later, he was 
killed by an Israeli helicopter attack.  After the killings 
of Yassin and al—Rantissi in 2004, Hamas initially refused 
to name their successor. 
E. INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO USE DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC 
PRESSURE 
Although Hamas has participated in terror acts, a 
strategy for dealing with Hamas must also consider the 
organization’s social and religious programs, and therefore 
should utilize diplomatic and economic measures.  Since the 
Hamas victory in 2006 elections, the West has attempted to 
use financial and diplomatic means to pressure Hamas to 
denounce violence and recognize Israel.  To date, these 
efforts have been unsuccessful, and there is a great deal 
of disagreement on whether these strategies will work. 
Economic isolation is one strategy the West is 
currently using in an attempt to restrict Hamas’ funding. 
Prior to winning the election, the PA was expected to 
fulfill the needs of the people and failed.  In contrast, 
nothing was expected of Hamas and its popularity grew 
because of what it did provide.  This was despite the PA 
providing more services than Hamas; the critical difference 
was that the people expected more from the PA. 
Now that Hamas is in control of Gaza, the burden of 
governance and taking care of the needs of the people is 
upon it.  If it fails, its ideology will be dealt a serious 
                     
78  Hroub, Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide, 127. 
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blow.  As stated earlier, the 2006 vote was primarily a 
protest vote against Fatah.  If Hamas struggles as Fatah 
did, the secular majority of Palestinians may again look 
for a new option.   
The West is currently trying to bring this situation 
to pass by supporting the PA and isolating Hamas.  It will 
be impossible to cut off all funding to Hamas, but 
continued pressure may impact the social programs Hamas 
uses to maintain the support of the people.  At the same 
time, the West is supporting the PA in the West Bank.  If 
the PA — with foreign assistance — can reduce corruption 
and govern more effectively than Hamas in Gaza, we can 
expect Hamas support to be undermined. 
Economic success in the West Bank could have a 
profound impact on Hamas supporters.  Jennifer Windsor 
writes, “Globalization has brought an unprecedented level 
of commercial and cultural penetration of societies, 
providing populations with ready proof of their 
comparatively poor economic and social status.”79   
Cutting off Hamas funding could have two main effects: 
reducing its ability to fund social programs and reducing 
payouts to the families of suicide bombers.  Sheikh Yassin 
stated in 2001 that Hamas pays out $2—3M monthly to the 
families of suicide bombers and imprisoned Hamas members.80  
Although financial motivations are usually secondary, Bill 
Keller reported in the New York Times that suicide bombings 
in Israel increased in March 2002 after Iraq increased the 
                     
79  Jennifer Windsor, Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism, 
The Washington Quarterly 26:3 (2003): 45. 
80  Levitt, Hamas, 59. 
 40
payment to families of suicide bombers from $10,000 to 
$25,000.81  It is unclear how much the rise in bombings was 
due to the increased payout.  However, the fact that 
payouts occurred at all suggests that Hamas and Iraq 
recognized they were a motivator at some level.  According 
to Levitt, “[d]isrupting the Hamas dawa is the most 
effective way of weakening Hamas.”82  
Another strategy used by the Bush administration was 
to push democratization in the Middle East.  Former Vice 
President Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice stated that resolution of the Israeli—
Palestinian conflict would require democracy to be embraced 
by the Arab world.83  Democracy in Palestine may seem to 
have backfired in 2006 when Hamas won the elections.  
However, if it is unable to govern effectively, this 
victory could undermine its popularity over the long term.   
The literature is split on whether pushing democracy 
is an appropriate response to Islamic fundamentalism.  
Jennifer Windsor wrote that promoting democracy “can 
provide a set of values and alternatives that offer a 
powerful alternative to the appeal of…extremism.”84  Fathali 
Moghaddam agreed, stating “[t]he best long-term policy 
against terrorism is prevention, which is made possible by 
nourishing contextualized democracy on the ground floor.”85 
                     
81  Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?” 
The New Republic (June 2002): 28. 
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Out?” Behind the Headlines 61 (2004): 11. 
84  Windsor, “Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism,” 1. 
85  Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism” American 
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On the other hand, Samuel Huntington wrote that 
“Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, 
constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the 
rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of 
church and state, often have little resonance in 
Islamic…cultures.”86  Anna Simons was more definitive in 
saying “democratizing the Middle East, were it possible, 
will not solve the problem.  It might ameliorate it, but it 
might also make things worse.”87 
In my opinion, for democratization to work, it must 
not be forced upon Palestinians.  Rather, economic pressure 
should be the means used to influence Hamas to moderate its 
views (or lead Palestinians to abandon Hamas).  The West 
should focus efforts on improving economic conditions in 
the West Bank and aid the PA to reduce corruption and 
improve governance.  If successful in improving conditions 
relative to Gaza, this approach could be a powerful 
influence on Palestinians. 
Finally, economic measures and democratization will 
not be effective until several core issues are resolved.  
Diplomatic efforts must ultimately solve the right of 
return for Palestinians, the disposition of Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank, and the security concerns of 
Israel. 
                     
86  Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 
72 (1993): 40. 
87  Anna Simons, “Making Enemies: Part I” The American Interest 1 
(2006): 8. 
 42
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 43
IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ON ISRAELI LEADERSHIP 
TARGETING 
Many authors have written that killing terrorists will 
perpetuate a cycle of violence and eventually result in 
more terrorism.  In 2004, Professor Ed Kaplan et al. 
published a study that attempted to objectively answer what 
affect Israeli leadership targeting had on suicide 
bombings.  This section examines the first Kaplan study, as 
well as two subsequent studies, and draw conclusions based 
on their findings. 
Professor Kaplan’s first study examined all Israeli 
strikes against terrorists (not just Hamas), and did not 
distinguish the effects of targeting leaders versus that of 
targeting operatives.  The study examined the period from 
2001 through 2003, during which there were 85 successful 
suicide bombings.88  As Kaplan et al. pointed out, the 
attacks were not evenly spread; there were thirteen attacks 
in March of 2002, but only seventeen in all of 2003.  In 
addition to the 85 successful attacks, there were also 
thirty—five attacks that were stopped by Israeli security 
forces, for a total of 120 attempted attacks. 
During the same period, Israel conducted seventy—five 
operations targeting terrorists, resulting in 119 
terrorists killed.89  However, 80 civilians were also killed 
in these attacks.  Tragically, there were ten attacks that 
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resulted in thirty—one civilian deaths but that did not 
succeed in killing a single terrorist.90 
The analysis found that targeted hits on terrorist 
leaders increased downstream terrorist attacks by 
increasing the number of terror recruits available for 
future attacks.  However, when the Israelis conducted 
Operation Defensive Shield — a large—scale military 
operation in 2002 — the focus changed from killing to 
arresting terrorists.  The study found that this shift in 
strategy resulted in the decline of suicide bombings in 
2003.  The authors concluded, “[t]his analysis suggests 
that preventive arrests, as opposed to the targeted 
killings of suspected terrorists, are responsible for the 
dramatic reduction in suicide bombings inside Israel since 
March 2002.”91 
There are many reasons to question the results of the 
study.  The authors raised many of these issues themselves, 
including: a) the effect of targeting killings and arrests 
likely reverberates for a longer period than the study, b) 
the policy of targeted killing may have been more effective 
if done at a greater rate, and c) the study evaluates 
killing and capturing as independent outcomes, rather than 
part of an overall strategy of fighting terrorism. 
In addition, capturing terrorists is not always 
practical.  Israel uses targeted killings as a last resort.  
Prior to conducting an operation, intelligence must 
indicate an imminent attack.  In addition, the Palestinian 
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Authority is given the opportunity to arrest the 
terrorist(s).  If it does not, and the Israelis conclude 
that an arrest cannot be made, then a targeted killing may 
be used to prevent the terrorist attack.92 
Kaplan et al. followed with a second study that 
contributes to our understanding of the capture versus 
killing debate by analyzing the effect of Israeli 
preparedness on the success rate of suicide bombing 
attempts.  Once again, they concluded that targeted killing 
increases suicide bombing attacks and that arrests decrease 
future attacks.  However, they find that the heightened 
alert status of Israeli security forces after a targeted 
killing results in more terrorists being caught attempting 
to retaliate.93 
In 2007, a third study was done by Kaplan and 
Jacobson.  This study, like the previous two, had 
weaknesses.94  All three assumed a homogeneous group of 
terrorists.  However, Hamas, PIJ and Fatah are not 
homogenous and responded in different ways. More 
importantly, these studies analyzed two strategies: killing 
vs. capturing terrorists.  But they did not evaluate the 
impact of other important strategies including the Israeli—
West Bank Barrier Wall, efforts to restrict Hamas funding, 
etc. 
                     
92  Steven David, “Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted 
Killing” Ethics and International Affairs (2003): 14. 
93  Ed Kaplan, Alex Mintz and Saul Mishal, “Tactical Prevention of 
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clear on the assumptions made, and on the related gaps in the analysis.   
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The third study contained conclusions in conflict with 
the first two.  Kaplan and Jacobsen used modeling and game 
theory to project future results and to overcome the 
weakness of the first two studies related to their fixed 
duration.  They found that the lowest level of casualties 
occurred when the government is more patient than 
terrorists in responding to violence.  In addition, there 
is an optimal level of operations against terrorists that 
is big enough to prevent large-scale terrorism, yet small 
enough to avoid provoking large-scale terrorist 
recruitment.  Their analysis concluded that targeting 
killings “can be optimal for a civilian casualty—minimizing 
government, even when hits serve to recruit more 
terrorists.”95   
                     
95  Daniel Jacobson and Ed Kaplan, “Suicide Bombings and Targeted 
Killings in (Counter-) Terror Games,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
51, no. 5 (2007): 783. 
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V. CONCLUSION: HAVE ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO TARGET 
HAMAS LEADERS BEEN AN EFFECTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM 
STRATEGY? 
Under the right circumstances, leadership targeting 
has been effective in combating terrorism.   Examples 
include the captures of Abimael Guzman and Shoko Asahara, 
and the resulting decline of Shining Path and Aum 
Shinrikyo.  Israel’s killing of Fathi Shiqaqi of the PIJ 
provides another example of effective leadership targeting 
more relevant to the Israeli—Palestinian conflict. 
In contrast, Hamas has weathered blow after blow to 
its leadership throughout the years.  Since 1988, Israel 
has conducted numerous mass arrests, dozens of targeted 
killings, and larger military incursions into the West Bank 
and Gaza.  Although Hamas has suffered from these measures, 
the organization has been resilient from the start.   
Hamas has survived in large part to the structure set 
up long before its inception on December 8, 1987.  The Gaza 
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood — under the leadership of 
Sheikh Yassin — built a network of social and Islamic 
institutions that allowed Hamas to grow into a powerful 
force at inception.  Armed with an established ideology, 
leadership depth, and extensive social programs, Hamas hit 
the ground running. 
The following chart uses the Freeman Model to show the 
relative importance of several Hamas leaders who were 
targeted by Israel (Figure 3).  It demonstrates that no 
leader has ever been important enough to Hamas for it to be 
vulnerable to a single decapitation strike.  
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Figure 3.   Relative Importance of Hamas Leaders Targeted by 
Israel 
Hamas’ leadership structure and depth compelled Israel 
to use sustained and multiple and/or synchronous 
decapitation strikes.  Two rounds of mass arrests, the 1992 
mass deportation, and the successful assassinations of 
Ayyash, Yassin, and al—Rantissi have all impacted Hamas to 
varying degrees.  
However, after the mass arrests of 1988 and 1989, 
Hamas created the outside leadership that enabled it to 
survive every Israeli leadership strike and arrest.  The 
organization became increasingly resilient until it 
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eventually became immune to decapitation.  Meanwhile, Hamas 
grew in power, culminating in its 2006 election victory. 
Although opinions on the effectiveness of Israel’s 
counter-leadership targeting vary, many authors believe 
that Israel’s efforts to target Hamas leaders have been 
effective.  According to Amos Guiora,  
[T]argeted killing has eliminated a significant 
number of key operatives, thereby disrupting the 
terrorist organizations, and it has seemingly 
discouraged (deterred) potential terrorists from 
taking part in the suicide bomber 
infrastructure.96   
In addition, Daniel Byman wrote that targeted killings 
combined with the border fence, military operations in Gaza 
and the West Bank, and other security measures have 
resulted in a precipitous drop in attacks.97  Steven R. 
David agreed that Israel should continue to target terror 
leaders despite the chance that “targeted killing has not 
appreciably diminished the costs of terrorist attacks and 
may have even increased them.”98   He pointed to successful 
examples of Israel targeting terror leaders, including the 
1995 operation that killed Fathi Shiqaqi.  In the 
aftermath, the organization “limped along for several 
years, unable to mount any serious attacks against Israeli 
interests.”99  Although Ayyash’s killing provoked four 
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retaliatory bombings, subsequent bombings were much less 
effective because other Hamas bomb makers lacked Ayyash’s 
expertise.100   
Another example of effective leadership targeting 
occurred during the Second Intifada.  Israel stepped up its 
practice of arresting leaders and conducted Operation 
Defensive Shield (ODS) in 2002.  ODS was a major military 
operation that included strict curfews, placing Yassar 
Arafat’s Ramallah compound under siege, and the detention 
of over 4,000 Palestinians.101 Subsequently, the 
effectiveness of Hamas suicide operations fell 
substantially.  According to the Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism, deaths per Hamas attack fell from 
5.4 in 2002 to 0.11 in 2005.  In addition, the rate of 
attacks fell dramatically. 
On the other hand, Zakhi Chehab writes that the 
“assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin did not seriously 
damage the power of Hamas’ internal leadership.”102  
Further, in an International Crisis Group (ICG) interview, 
an Israeli intelligence officer recognizes the “astounding 
rapidity with which Hamas fills vacant leadership 
positions.”103  
The same ICG report points out that “Israel and U.S. 
security forces believe targeted assassinations…[restrain] 
Hamas and contribute to Hamas’ less hard—line comments.”  
Ultimately, the ICG concludes by stating that “Hamas today 
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is politically stronger if operationally weaker” as a 
result of Israeli leadership attacks.  
The combination of counterterrorism methods used by 
Israel makes it difficult to attribute success to a single 
method.  Given that most Hamas leaders are in Quadrant IV 
of the Freeman model, it is important that Israel employ a 
broad approach — including targeted killings — in order to 
effectively disrupt Hamas.   
This case study demonstrates that once a terror group 
reaches Quadrant IV, the state must engage in a high tempo 
of attacks.  The pace of attacks must be high enough to 
outstrip the terrorists’ ability to replenish their 
resources.  This tempo is only possible with great 
intelligence and the ability to rapidly respond to 
information on terrorist location.  Thus, this tactic may 
only be effective in a situation similar to the Israeli—
Palestinian conflict: shared border, small geographic area, 
etc. 
Prior to his assassination by Israel, Hamas co—founder 
al—Rantissi admitted that the targeting killings by Israel 
hampered Hamas.  Further evidence that the policy worked 
came when Hamas did not retaliate for al-Rantissi’s death.  
Khaled Hroub wrote, “[o]n the ground, there is no question 
that Hamas has been seriously weakened by the decimation of 
its ranks through assassination and arrest.”104 
In conclusion, targeting Hamas leaders has been an 
effective counterterrorism strategy.  Although Hamas has 
been immune to leadership decapitation from the start, 
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Israeli operations have deprived Hamas of key inspirational 
and operational leaders.  As predicted by the Freeman 
model, it required a sustained tempo of multiple 
synchronous operations due to the communal and 
decentralized nature of Hamas’ leadership.  The method 
(kill vs. capture) Israel used has been critical, as Israel 
paid a political price due to civilian casualties, and 
Hamas was bolstered by them.  Ultimately, Israel relied on 
a combination of measures to supplement leadership 
targeting, including armed incursions into Gaza and the 
West Bank, and the construction of the security wall.   
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